Remembering to forget: Sabbateanism, national identity, and subjectivity in Turkey by Neyzi, Leyla
Remembering to Forget:
Sabbateanism, National Identity,
and Subjectivity in Turkey
LEYLA NEYZI
Sabancı University
I was seven or eight years old. We were walking in Taksim [a neighborhood in Istanbul]
with a close friend of my parents I called “aunt.” Accompanying us was an acquaintance
of my aunt. There had been some kind of talk about where we were from. “We are from
Salonica,” I declared with confidence. In my eyes, being from Salonica was no differ-
ent than being from Istanbul. When we came home, my aunt pulled me aside. She said,
“From now on, you will never say ‘I am from Salonica’ to someone you don’t know.
This is very demeaning, people will look down upon you.” I started to cry, protesting,
“Why?” All kinds of evil words came rushing to my child’s mind. Were they thieves?
Were they immoral? Why should we be ashamed?
According to Fatma Arıg˘, a fifty-one-year-old Turkish woman of Sabbatean
heritage, her search for the past began with this shock she recalls experiencing
as a child. Her quest was fulfilled by way of history, for lack of memory. Be-
hind her story lies a little-known community, and its three hundred and fifty-
year-old relationship with the state and the dominant society in Turkey. 
Sabbateanism, known in Turkish as dönme (“convert”) or Selanikli (“being
from Salonica”), refers to the followers of Sabbatai Sevi, a Jewish rabbi from
Izmir (Smyrna) who declared himself the messiah in the seventeenth century,
initiating a messianic movement that divided the Jewish community. The forced
conversion of Sevi to Islam under Ottoman rule resulted in the emergence of a
double identity based on dissimulation. Of Jewish origin, Sevi’s followers
maintained a Muslim identity in public and a Sabbatean identity in private in
their base in Salonica. Descendants of the Sabbatean community of Ottoman
Salonica now live mostly in Turkey, in the city of Istanbul. Officially Muslim
Turkish citizens, they have been ardent supporters of the Turkish modernity
project. Yet the question of origins continues to rankle, even as the community
has largely assimilated.
The question of what Sabbateanism means in contemporary Turkey raises a
related, even more thorny question concerning national identity itself. In this
article, I will argue that Sabbatean identity is a useful vantage point through
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which to examine the contradictions and limits of national identity in Turkey:
individuals of Sabbatean heritage both identified with and were betrayed by the
Turkish modernity project. The case of Sabbateanism in Republican Turkey
points up the Janus-faced character of Turkish national identity: while Kemal-
ism—centered on the cult of personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder
of modern Turkey—was based on modernist values predicated on a rejection
of tradition, Turkishness continued to be defined vis-à-vis Sunni Muslim her-
itage identified with an imagined Turkish ethnicity. 
In this article, I will use the life history narrative of Fatma Arıg˘ to examine
the consequences for subjectivity of the attempt to create a new basis for indi-
vidual identity in Republican Turkey. I will show that the rejection of the past
resulted in a potential conflict between family identity and national identity on
the part of individuals. Performing Turkishness, subjects felt the need to hide
alternate histories in the public sphere, and sometimes in the familial sphere as
well. As Arıg˘’s narrative shows, in Sabbatean families parents colluded in this
process of erasure by emphasizing their Kemalist heritage while suppressing
the Sabbatean past, for it was those with multiple identities who felt the most
pressure to perform a singular identity.
The rediscovery of history in Turkish society in the 1990s suggests that the
Turkish modernity project’s attempt to create a new basis for identity has been
limited by the refusal to acknowledge the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Em-
pire. Unlike her parents, and speaking in the present, Fatma Arıg˘ refuses to hide
her ethnic/religious origins. Despite widespread political polarization, the turn
to the past in Turkish society suggests the emergence of a new subjectivity (and
demands for a new concept of citizenship) predicated upon having a personal
history which necessitates the public acknowledgement of a plural cultural her-
itage.
challenging modernity: the turn to the past 
Carolyn Steedman (1995a) argues that modernity, as it emerged in England in
the nineteenth century, resulted in the development of a new concept of child-
hood. Over time, childhood came to represent the (lost) past which formed the
basis of a sense of self. Steedman’s work follows Freud’s classic work (1953)
in underscoring the central link between an individual’s relationship to the past
and her personhood. Current reassessments of our notions of—and experiences
with—modernity raise anew the relationship between history and subjectivity. 
Intriguingly, the futuristic society emerging as a result of globalization has
been marked by a distinct turn to the past. In an era in which all times have be-
come contemporaneous, this may signal a search for continuity, an anchor in a
sea of flux (Huyssen 1995). The turn to the past is also linked to a disillusion-
ment with the promises of modernity, including those of the nation-state
(Shapiro 2000). Turning to the past, modernity’s critics have called for a re-
assessment of the study of history itself, insofar as the latter converges with 
official/national history (Crane 1996). The growing interest in studies of mem-
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ory, including the rediscovery of oral history, attests to the search for alterna-
tive means of accessing the past (Antze and Lambek 1996). Yet the past does
not simply await discovery: it is reconstructed in and for the purposes of the
present (Sturken 1997). Memory might be best conceptualized as recherché
rather than recuperation (Huyssen 1995:3). 
The turn to the past in the present tends to work through fractured subjectiv-
ities (Kenny 1999): intergenerational relations play a key role in processes of
remembering and forgetting, families often colluding in the work of erasure ini-
tiated by nationalist projects (Yogi 1996). What then of tales not told, experi-
ences not shared? Recent work on “post-memory” suggests—as Freud discov-
ered long ago (Wilson 1998)—that memory is as much about forgetting, and
the violence embodied in silence, as it is about remembering (Goertz 1998). As
Michael Taussig puts it, “secrecy magnifies reality” (Taussig 1999). This rais-
es the question as to how personhood may be generated out of silence, partic-
ularly in cases where the relationship to the past is fraught with violence (Bhab-
ha 1994). 
the turkish modernity project 
Recent discussions of non-Western experiences with modernity have suggest-
ed referring to modernity in the plural to account for the historicity of these 
alternate experiences (Gaonkar 1999). As Fanon’s pioneering work (1991)
shows, due to their deep ambivalence towards a past scarred by colonization
non-Western modernities tend to produce subjects particularly divided against
themselves (Camus 1996). In the case of Turkey, ambivalence towards the past
was the product not of colonization but of the deliberate rejection of Turkey’s
Ottoman legacy by modernist elites (Bozdog˘an and Kasaba 1997). As the writer
Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar poetically demonstrates, the modern Turkish persona
is caught between desire for (what is viewed as) an inevitable future and the ex-
perienced past (Tanpınar 1997[1949]). This is symbolized by the adoption of
Western-style (alafranga) time reckoning in the 1930s. 
The Turkish case constitutes a particularly early and radical experiment with
modernity at the margins of Europe (Zurcher 1993). The Turkish Republic was
established in 1923, on the ruins of an Islamic Empire reduced to the space of
Anatolia. While the Ottoman Empire served as Christian Europe’s “other,” it
included within its domain European territories and interacted closely with Eu-
ropean society from its inception. A Westernization movement emerged from
the eighteenth century. Yet by the end of World War I, what remained of the Ot-
toman Empire was on the verge of colonization by the European powers. The
nationalist movement spearheaded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1919 had its
origins in the Young Turk movement in the nineteenth century. By 1923, the
Kemalists had won their battle against outside invasion; now the internal bat-
tle to establish a new society began, a battle that continues to polarize Turkish
society to this day.
Because their Western education led them to internalize modernist values,
sabbateanism, identity, and subjectivity in turkey 139
and because of the collusion between the Ottoman dynasty and the European
powers at the end of World War I, the Kemalist elite positioned itself squarely
against tradition (Atatürk 1989[1934]). The Ottoman Empire was a multicul-
tural society in which communities were organized on the basis of religion (In-
alcık 1997). Establishing a secular democracy, the Kemalist elite did away with
both the Ottoman dynasty and the Islamic caliphate. Beginning in the 1920s, a
series of legal and institutional reforms were promulgated which aimed at mod-
ernizing Turkish society from the top down (Zurcher 1993). These included sec-
ularization of the legal system, the adoption of a Western-style alphabet, cal-
endar, system of time-reckoning, and dress, including the “heathen” (gavur)
hat, which replaced the Turkish fez. Turkish national identity is centered on the
cult of personality of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, whose black-and-white pho-
tographs in elegant European clothes entered the family albums of the urban
elite. 
The Turkish experience raises the question as to what extent Kemalism has
succeeded in creating its own tradition as the basis for subjectivity, and what
the relationship of this new subject is to the past. Whereas the population of the
Ottoman Empire was multireligious, multiethnic and multilingual, for histori-
cal, ideological and pragmatic reasons by the early twentieth century the emerg-
ing Turkish nationalist movement had come to identify primarily with the 
Turkish-speaking population of Muslim origin (Kiris¸çi 2000). Thus, while Ke-
malism was centered on a modernist ideology based on what were viewed as
universal values emanating from the European Enlightenment, Turkishness re-
mained identified with Sunni Muslim heritage associated with an imagined
Turkish ethnicity. In this sense, Turkish national identity is both inclusive and
exclusionary. It is inclusive insofar as it is defined in terms of a commitment to
secular modernist values on the part of citizens of Turkey. It is exclusionary in-
sofar as it is defined vis-à-vis a single language and a single imagined ethnici-
ty associated with a particular religious heritage. 
The Janus-faced character of Turkish national identity had important conse-
quences for the population which remained in or immigrated to (or were forced
to emigrate from) Anatolia by the 1920s. Although all citizens of modern
Turkey were Turkish by law, some Turks were more equal than others (Aktar
2000). After the war between Greece and Turkey following the invasion of Ot-
toman territories by the European powers in 1919, the Greek Orthodox popu-
lation of Anatolia was exchanged with the Muslim population of Greece (Arı
1995). Under the Republic, Christians and Jews remained as small minorities
whose rights as officially acknowledged minorities were guaranteed by the
Lausanne Treaty of 1923. Despite their support for the Kemalist project,
though, Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin remained potential outsiders in
Republican Turkey, experiencing discrimination and encouraged (if not forced)
to emigrate (Bali 1999b). 
Ironically, members of the so-called dominant majority, or Turkish citizens
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of presumably Muslim heritage (which includes officially unacknowledged mi-
norities) also have an identity problem. For the category “Turk” (commonly
used synonymously with “Muslim”) disguises the diversity of linguistic, eth-
nic and religious origins of Turkey’s “majority” population. Due to the perfor-
mance of a singular identity in the public sphere, however, these alternative his-
tories remain unacknowledged, and may even be suppressed at the level of the
individual psyche. This has consequences for individuals’ ability to develop a
sense of self, insofar as subjectivity is predicated on having a personal history. 
The term dönme (“convert,” or she who has “turned”) is historically associ-
ated with Sabbateanism, viewed as a community with a double identity.
Metaphorically speaking, though, the term dönme, insofar as it connotes a con-
tinuously changing or unstable identity, may well be applied collectively to the
citizens of Turkey, whose identities are highly contingent and contextual, prag-
matically adapted to performing identity in an insecure environment character-
ized by a historic separation between the public/official and the familial/pri-
vate domains. To the extent that Kemalism has created its own tradition—
particularly among the educated middle-class—familial and national identity
have converged. But this occurred through the invasion of the private domain
by the national/official domain (Göle 1997) and the deliberate silencing of al-
ternate histories, particularly in cases where family identity conflicted with na-
tional identity. It was often those with multiple identities, such as the Sab-
bateans, who felt the most need to conform, actively colluding in the process
of denying the past. Elders within the family played a central role in this
process. Nevertheless, the turn to the past in the present suggests that the Turk-
ish modernity project has been limited in its attempt to create a new basis for
subjectivity.
Oriented towards the future for three generations, Turkish society is redis-
covering its past at the millennium. The 1990s marked a watershed in the open-
ing up of the Pandora’s box of history (Bozdog˘an and Kasaba 1997). Global-
ization, including the incorporation of the Turkish economy into the circuits of
global capital, the rise of diasporic communities in Western Europe, and the
emergence of a new, privatized media, played a role in this process (Keyman
1995). No longer taken for granted, or able to dominate society on its own, Ke-
malism has been facing major challenges, resulting in a highly polarized debate
on Republican history and national identity (Kadıog˘lu 1998). During the 1980s,
a separatist Kurdish nationalist movement and an Islamist movement chal-
lenged the status quo (Yavuz 1999). The neo-Kemalist, Turkish nationalist, and
Alevi movements that emerged in response, as well as the unacknowledged war
in eastern Turkey, accelerated the political polarization of Turkish society
(Mater 1998). Widespread corruption and political violence have resulted in the
fragmentation of the state into private mafias, and this has contributed to the
delegitimation of the political system and the sense of insecurity and unrest.
The earthquake of 17 August 1999 acted as a catalyst for a proliferation of civ-
sabbateanism, identity, and subjectivity in turkey 141
il organization, resulting in large numbers of issue-based NGOs demanding a
more participatory democracy. 
The new media has played a major role in bridging the gap between the pri-
vate and the public spheres in Turkey by bringing previously taboo issues into
the public domain (Gürbilek 1992). Growing interest in genres such as autobi-
ography, the historical novel, oral history, and neighborhood and regional his-
tory in the last decade reflects a new concern with the past on the part of indi-
viduals. At the same time, as the issue of identity and it relationship to history
has entered the public domain, it has become rapidly depoliticized, trivialized,
and commodified (Kırca 2000). A nostalgia industry has emerged, ostensibly
offering up tidbits from a “lost” past such as the cosmopolitan neighborhoods
of Istanbul complete with their “lost” minority populations. 
Despite its surface treatment in the media, the growing interest in identity in
Turkish society shows that the past continues to cast its long shadow onto the
present. The question of identity and its relationship to history is a deep wound
in Turkish society which requires a deep incision in order to heal. But facing
the experienced past, rather than a constructed nostalgia, means facing up to the
violence experienced in this society during this century—whether between the
state and particular communities, between communities, between generations,
or within the individual psyche itself. It means confronting the exclusionary as-
pects of national identity, and its high cost for individuals. For taboos about the
past perhaps do most violence in ways not easily visible or voiced: through the
secrecy and fear that works silently within the psyche. Sabbatean identity is a
case in point.
sabbateanism: a short history
Terminology
Three different terms are used in Turkish to characterize the followers of Sab-
batai Sevi: Sabetaycı (Sabbateans), dönme (“turned” or convert), and Selanikli
(“from Salonica”). While the term Sabetaycı (as well as ma’aminim, “believ-
ers”) is a neutral term used by insiders, the terms dönme and Selanikli are some-
what derogatory terms used by non-Sabbateans primarily as terms of refer-
ence.1
Dervis¸ (1986), who places the term in quotation marks, emphasizes the am-
biguity characterizing the term dönme: Presumably referring to conversion
from Judaism or Sabbateanism to Islam, the term implies a conversion that is
not genuine.2 There is a stigma attached to the term dönme, which, like the term
Kızılbas¸, tends to connote dissimulation and harbors allegations of heterodox
practices often linked to incest.3 The fact that the term dönme is also used in
contemporary Turkish to refer to persons who have undergone a change in sex-
ual identity, adds an additional layer of ambiguity (and notoriety) to this already
ambiguous term.4
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During the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in 1923–
1924, most families belonging to the Sabbatean community in Salonica moved
to Turkey. Since then, the term Selanikli (‘from Salonica’) has been used syn-
onymously with the term dönme, despite the fact that many Muslims who came
from Salonica were not of Sabbatean origin. The imprecision of the term Se-
lanikli only adds a further layer of ambiguity to the confusion surrounding Sab-
batean identity.
Sabbatai Sevi esperamo a ti5
Sabbetai Sevi (1626–1676), the leader of the messianic movement which be-
came known as Sabbateanism, was a rabbi (haham) in the Ottoman city of Izmir
(Smyrna). During the seventeenth century, messianic ideas associated with
Jewish mysticism became highly influential in Jewish communities, affected as
they were by the oppression of Jews in places such as Poland and Russia. As a
young man, Sevi was influenced by kabbalism as a form of intellectual and spir-
itual expression, and especially its Lurianic strain based on the teachings of
Isaac Ashkenazi Luria of Safed. In 1665, in collaboration with his self-declared
“prophet,” a young scholar known as Nathan of Gaza (1644–1680), Sevi de-
clared himself the messiah the Jews were waiting for to deliver them from their
suffering. He swiftly gained a large following among the masses, and even
among the elite (Scholem 1973). This led to a great upheaval in Jewish com-
munities, both in the Ottoman domains and elsewhere, where the daily life of
business and trade was disrupted. In synagogues in Ottoman territories, the
name of Sevi began to replace that of the Sultan in traditional prayers. Pro-
nouncing God’s name, forbidden in Jewish tradition, Sevi allowed the trans-
gression of established laws. A new calendar was introduced which dated from
the day Sevi declared himself messiah. 
Alerted by the Jewish establishment, The Ottoman authorities responded in
a careful and cunning manner to these unprecedented events. Sevi was arrest-
ed and eventually brought to the court of Mehmet IV in the city of Edirne, where
he was forced to publicly convert to Islam. According to a common tale still
told, Sevi entered the Sultan’s court with a pigeon hidden under his cloak. By
releasing the pigeon after the apostasy, he symbolically declared that the “soul”
(can) who converted was not his own, but that of the animal upon his breast. 
After the apostasy, the messianic movement became a sectarian one, as all
outward signs of Sabbateanism were disguised and a heretic theology emerged.
Sevi’s later life was marked by a double life; this double identity would become
the hallmark of Sabbateanism. Sevi’s eighteen “commandments” included an
injunction to practice dissimulation and a proscription against marrying Mus-
lims. The secrecy associated with Sabbateanism is linked to the community’s
relationship to the Ottoman state, and the need to maintain a separate public
(Muslim) and a private (Sabbatean) identity (Nassi 1992). As Barnai (1992)
notes, however, Sabbatean identity was an “open secret,” since both insiders
sabbateanism, identity, and subjectivity in turkey 143
and outsiders were aware of the difference between its two aspects, a difference
which was not, however, publicly or officially articulated. This set the scene for
the continual circulation of rumour concerning who was said to be Sabbatean
and what this secret difference consisted of. 
The Dönme of Salonica: 1683–1923
Sabbatai Sevi died in exile in Albania in 1676. After his death, mass apostasy
led to the formation of what became known as the dönme sect in Salonica,
where several hundred families converted in 1683 (Scholem 1971). Over time,
this community split into three separate groups, known as the Yakubi (Jaco-
bites), the Kapancı, and the Karakas¸lı (Ortaylı 1998). Jacob (Filosof) Querido
was Sabbatai Sevi’s brother-in-law, whom Sevi’s widow declared to be an in-
carnation of Sevi (Scholem 1971). Those who followed Querido split off from
the main group in 1689, becoming known as the Yakubi. Afurther split occurred
when the son of an early convert, Baruchya Russo (Osman Baba), who was born
nine months after the death of Sevi, was also proclaimed to be an incarnation
of Sevi. At his death in 1720, Osman Baba was viewed as divine, and his grave
venerated. His adherents (Karakas¸lı) created their own group. Those who re-
jected both Querido and Osman Baba, but remained faithful to Sevi became
known as the Kapancı. Descendants of these three communities remain distinct
up to the present. 
Western ideas began to influence Ottoman society beginning in the eigh-
teenth century, leading to a radical change in mentality, particularly among the
educated elite (Haniog˘lu 1986). These new ideas associated with the European
Enlightenment were particularly influential in cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, and
Salonica, port cities with a cosmopolitan population and close ties to Europe
(Georgeon 1993). The Jewish and Sabbatean communities in Salonica played
a central role in the dissemination of these ideas, and it was out of the conver-
gence between the Jewish, Sabbatean, and Muslim Enlightenment that the
Young Turk movement emerged to challenge the Ottoman regime.6 As Haniog˘-
lu notes (1986), all forms of opposition to the regime of Abdülhamid II joined
in support of the Young Turks.
Westernized education played a key role in this transformation. Following
the opening of the French-based Alliance Israelite Universelle schools in Sa-
lonica, different communities competed to establish schools offering a Western
education (Georgeon 1993). Sabbateans excelled as educators. The new schools
established by Sabbateans in Salonica included Feyz-i Sıbyan, Terakki (a Ka-
pancı school that would reemerge as S¸is¸li Terakki Lisesi in Istanbul), Feyziye
(a Karakas¸lı school that became Is¸ık Lisesi in Istanbul) and Feyzi Ati (a Yakubi
school that became Bog˘aziçi Lisesi in Istanbul). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the
first president of Republican Turkey, was himself educated in a Sabbatean
school in Salonica run by the well-known educator S¸emsi Efendi.
By the late nineteenth century, Sabbateans had become increasingly power-
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ful in Salonican society, distinguishing themselves in government service as
well as in trade, the professions, and the press. In the 1880s, young Sabbateans
established a journal called Gonca-ı Edeb, in which they argued in favor of a
secularist world view and challenged the conservative older generation (Ortaylı
1998). Sabbateans played key roles in the first government of the Young Turks
in 1908; Mehmet Cavid Bey from the Karakas¸ group acted as Minister of Fi-
nance.7 The marriage in 1915 of the progressive journalist Zekeriya Sertel to a
young Sabbatean woman, Sabiha (who would become a renowned journalist
and writer in her own right) was supported by the Young Turks’ Committee of
Union and Progress as a sign of the changing times (Sertel 1977).8
Who is “From Salonica”?: Under the Turkish Republic
The Sabbatean community in Salonica numbered ten to fifteen thousand per-
sons by the first decade of the twentieth century (Scholem 1971). With the es-
tablishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, a population exchange took place
between Greece and Turkey. Muslim subjects of Greece were exchanged for
the Greek Orthodox subjects of Turkey (Arı 1995).9 At this time, most Sab-
batean families moved to Turkey, and to the cosmopolitan and wealthy districts
of the city of Istanbul in particular. The assimilation of the Sabbateans, which
began in the Young Turk period, accelerated under the Turkish Republic. Al-
ready distanced from a Sabbatean identity as a result of their secular education,
they identified with the Turkish modernity project personified by their fellow
Salonican, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 
Based primarily in the city of Istanbul, individuals of Sabbatean origin main-
tained their commitment to Western education, raising their children as highly
educated urban middle-class citizens prominent in trade, industry, education,
and the media. Committed for the most part to assimilation, they kept a low 
profile concerning their origins and remained largely invisible in the public
sphere—the few notable exceptions only served to reinforce this commitment.
Two major events brought Sabbateanism into public view in Republican
Turkey: The Karakas¸lı Rüs¸dü Affair of 1924 and the Capital Levy of 1942–
1944.10 In January of 1924, Rüs¸dü Bey, who belonged to the most conserva-
tive group of Sabbateans in Turkey, made an appeal to the Turkish Parliament
in which he critiqued Sabbateans for not being “true” Muslims/Turks (Ortaylı
1998). This unusual public statement, caused, it seems, by Rüs¸dü Bey’s ex-
communication due to his marriage to a person from outside the group, result-
ed in widespread public debate on Sabbatean identity. Reportedly, many
documents were destroyed during this period by families fearing an official in-
vestigation (Zorlu 1998), and the Karakas¸lı Rüs¸dü affair seems to have
strengthened the resolve of Sabbateans to assimilate. 
After the Karakas¸lı Rüs¸dü affair, Sabbatean identity faded again from pub-
lic view until the Capital Levy of 1942.11 During World War II, the Turkish gov-
ernment instituted a head tax, the declared goal of which was to tax those who
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had made fortunes as a result of the war economy. The Capital Levy, which re-
mained in force between 11 November 1942 and 15 March 1944, had another
goal that was not officially stated: to make possible the transfer of capital from
the non-Muslim communities of Jews, Armenians, and Greek Orthodox to the
majority population of Muslim origin (Akar 1999). The Capital Levy largely
succeeded in replacing the non-Muslim bourgeoisie of the city of Istanbul with
a bourgeoisie of Muslim origin (Aktar 2000). 
Although they were officially Muslim, individuals of Sabbatean background
were charged higher taxes than Muslims, and treated in the same manner as
non-Muslims during the Capital Levy episode (Ökte 1951). Of the two indi-
viduals charged the highest amount of tax during this period, one was Jewish
and the other of Sabbatean origin (Tavs¸anog˘lu 1999). The Capital Levy was ex-
perienced as a great shock by persons of Sabbatean background who identified
with the Turkish Republic and Turkish national identity, and who had largely
ruptured their ties to a Sabbatean identity. The Capital Levy episode did more
than demonstrate the exclusionary nature of national identity in Turkey; it sug-
gested that anyone can be considered a potential outsider in a society where the
basis of identity is essentially unstable. The deep-seated paranoia and the con-
stant search for “the enemy within” which characterizes Turkish political cul-
ture is a product of the Turkish modernity project’s refusal to acknowledge the
past.
Whereas fear and the experience of discrimination had historically rein-
forced the practice of dissimulation, most families of Sabbatean background,
committed as they were to assimilation under the Turkish Republic, took a more
radical stance after the Capital Levy episode. With the goal of protecting their
children, they chose to deny their heritage even within the family, and to en-
courage mixed marriages. As a result, the Sabbatean community has largely
ceased to be a separate community, while a wall of silence within the family
has created a rift between parents and children. 
The public debate about Sabbatean identity was reopened in the 1990s with
the work of Ilgaz Zorlu, a writer of part-Sabbatean heritage. In 1998, Zorlu pub-
lished a book entitled “Yes, I am ‘from Salonica.’” With this provocative title,
he appealed to persons of Sabbatean heritage to acknowledge their ethnic/reli-
gious identity. Ostensibly an attempt to come to terms with his personal past,
Zorlu’s work, combined with his exposure in the media, has turned into a me-
dia campaign to bring Sabbateanism into public view as an ethnic/religious
identity. It has done so in a way that has unfortunately encouraged pre-existing
stereotypes about the community to resurface, has played into the hands of anti-
semitic groups (Bali 1999a), and made it more difficult for individuals of Sab-
batean heritage to publicly discuss their identity (Baer 1999).12
the life history narrative of fatma arıg˘
There is little contemporary research on Sabbateanism in Turkey due in large
part to the reluctance of persons of Sabbatean heritage to speak publicly about
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their identity. This makes it difficult to understand what this identity means in
contemporary Turkey, and the extent to which a community may be said to ex-
ist.13 Historically, families belonging to the Yakubi group are known to have
assimilated earliest, and today individuals of Yakubi background tend to deny
their Sabbatean origins altogether. A minority of Karakas¸lı families, on the oth-
er hand, are said to maintain group endogamy and Sabbatean beliefs. Because
of their historic commitment to public silence, though, little is known of this
conservative minority. Kapancı families are located in-between: closer to their
Sabbatean origins than the Yakubi, they have become committed to assimila-
tion under the Turkish Republic. Today, individuals of Kapancı background are
more likely to acknowledge their origins.
In a recent study, Özgür Canel (1999) writes that she found individuals en-
gaged in the process of searching for their past, rather than a discrete commu-
nity.14 She notes a search for the meaning of Sabbatean identity on the part of
her informants, whose sense of “we” appears highly contingent and contextu-
al. Canel also mentions significant generational differences: she points out that
members of the first generation that migrated to Turkey chose to hide their iden-
tity, while members of the second generation became increasingly distanced
from an identity they knew little about. According to Canel, only in the third
generation did individuals express a desire to know more about the past.
Canel’s findings are confirmed by a French documentary film made about
Sabbateanism (Blumental and Grosman 1992). In this film, several witnesses
of Sabbatean background speak about the perception of Sabbateanism in Turk-
ish society, their own experiences growing up, and their personal search for the
past and the meaning of Sabbatean identity.15 The filmmakers note that inter-
viewees tend to use the term “them” rather than “us” in referring to Sabbateans,
expressing the measure of distance they feel towards this identity. Witnesses in
the film tell stories of growing up without being told of their origins. At the
same time, they acknowledge an awareness of being different in some way,
without knowing what this difference consists of. 
The interviewees represent Salonica as a lost paradise. They state emphati-
cally their belief that modern ideas came to Turkey by way of Salonica. As-
similation has meant that persons of Sabbatean origins have lost their links to
Sabbateanism as a belief system, while not becoming Muslims either: they ap-
proximate the secular ideal aspired to by Kemalism. It seems that, no longer as-
sociated with Sabbatean beliefs, their difference now consists of their sense of
being more modern, more enlightened, more educated than the rest of society.
Ironically, though, their origins continue to matter, insofar as Turkishness is de-
fined vis-à-vis an imagined Turkish ethnicity. The anti-Semitism of the Islamist
and Turkish nationalist movements has not helped. This is why persons of Sab-
batean background are so reluctant to face their personal past: they fear being
treated as outsiders in their own society. 
As the work of Blumental and Grosman (1992), Zorlu (1998), and Canel
(1999) shows, the turn to the past in Turkish society has had its effect on per-
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sons of Sabbatean background, who have also begun to search for their personal
history—although most continue to hide their origins in public. As the life his-
tory narrative of Fatma Arıg˘ demonstrates, there is a growing demand on the
part of Turkish citizens for the right to a personal history which acknowledges
the plural cultural heritage of the people of Turkey. Fatma Arıg˘, an articulate,
professional woman living in Istanbul, was among the small number of people
of Sabbatean background willing to be interviewed for the film Sazanikos (Blu-
mental and Grosman 1992). Several years later, she accepted my invitation to
narrate her life history and allowed her name and photograph to appear in the
Turkish media.16 Arıg˘’s critical perspective and her willingness to speak out de-
rives in part from her experience with the left during her student years. But it
is also a sign of changing times: at a time when Turkish society is rediscover-
ing its past, Arıg˘ felt ready to confront the silence which she believed had poi-
soned her life. The interview itself was highly structured—not by my questions
as much as by the way she herself constructed her narrative. Fatma Arıg˘ had a
point of view, and was ready to speak publicly.
Fatma Arıg˘’s narrative makes it possible to address the question of what it
means to be raised in a family of Sabbatean heritage in contemporary Turkey.17
She expresses anger against her family and community for colluding with the
Kemalist state in denying the past. She believes that her difficulties in devel-
oping a personal identity were caused by the silence, secrecy, and shame con-
cerning the past. From her youth she had tried to learn about the past by read-
ing about the history of Sabbateanism, and through an archaeology of the
silence that constituted her memory. Yet, despite her acknowledgement of her
ethnic/religious origins, Arıg˘’s narrative demonstrates the extent to which her
identity has been shaped by Kemalism, which has for generations replaced Sab-
batean identity in assimilationist families.
Fatma Arıg˘ was born in Istanbul in 1949. Her family belongs to the Kapancı
group of the Sabbateans. She was educated in Istanbul, attending S¸is¸li Terakki
(a private school founded by the Kapancı group) and a German high school (a
private school mostly attended by children of the educated elite). Arıg˘ worked
for many years for the Turkish daily Cumhuriyet, a newspaper known for its
leftist views—a peculiarly Turkish left wedded to Kemalism. Most recently,
until a tragic debilitating illness, Arıg˘ was working as the manager of a private
research foundation in Istanbul.
Fatma Arıg˘’s grandparents were born and raised in Salonica. While stating
that Sabbateanism was a belief system rooted in everyday practice for her
grandparents’ generation, Arıg˘ nevertheless describes her own grandmothers
largely in terms of their commitment to modernist values: “If my grandmother
had lived, she would have been over a hundred years old today. In that era, she
was a woman who had graduated from high school and spoke French. Both my
grandmothers read novels, and knew French poems by heart. There is a Euro-
peanness about being from ‘the other side of the water.’”18
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Arıg˘’s mother, whose family moved to Izmir from Salonica after the Balkan
War (1912–1913), ran her own business in the textile industry until she retired.
Fatma Arıg˘’s father was a chemical engineer, born in Salonica. He came to Is-
tanbul in 1923 at the age of twelve during the population exchange between
Greece in Turkey. According to Arıg˘, her parents’ generation, largely brought
up under the Republic, identified with the Kemalist project in the hopes that
they would belong to the “we” that constituted the new nation. For them, the
Republic signified “an event which expressed a modern outlook on the world,
which they shared, believing that they would gain a respectable place in the
mainland following the exchange of populations.”
While Sabbateanism was on the wane as a belief system, the community re-
mained a sociological fact during Arıg˘’s childhood. The community remained
distinct due to established social networks, relatedness, inmarriage, a custom
of helping the needy, and the sense of being perceived as ‘different’by the dom-
inant society: “It’s as if I was raised with countless aunts, uncles and cousins.
Some kind of relation could always be found between people. Whenever mis-
fortune befell anyone, all members of the group became mobilized. My parents
spent most of their lives with the children of their parents’ friends. They all went
to the same schools, where children of the needy were given scholarships.”
In Arıg˘’s generation, on the other hand, endogamy has decreased. Although
inmarriage is still practiced by certain conservative Sabbatean families, Arıg˘,
like her counterparts among the Westernized Turkish elite, tends to critique
these families (or Anatolians who marry their cousins) for maintaining “non-
scientific feudal practices.” According to Arıg˘, the question of origins was ir-
relevant in her choice of marriage partner: she claims that she found out that
her mother-in-law was of Sabbatean background only after she was married. 
Arıg˘ was raised in the 1950s, at a time when the Sabbatean community was
still smarting from the effects of the Capital Levy, when “they felt the fascism
of the state upon them. This is a blow they did not expect.” Although no one in
Arıg˘’s family was sent to a labor camp, they had to pay large sums as tax, and
it was the sense of being treated as outsiders that affected them most: “They
looked at people’s birth certificates to see if they were born in Salonica. They
were told: ‘You are dönme and must pay this tax.’ It’s not just the money. That
sense of rejection affected them deeply. They felt shame for being called ‘dön-
me.’”
Arıg˘ claims that the reason she experienced a personal identity crisis begin-
ning with the shock she lived at the age of seven, is because her family denied
the past: “‘Who am I?’ This is a perfectly natural question to ask. Yet when I
say ‘I am from Salonica,’ I am told to be silent.” Arıg˘ recounts that repression
only aroused her curiosity and desire to find out about the past. Yet it was dif-
ficult for her to learn anything from her family: “They said, ‘Some people are
born in Istanbul, and others in Salonica. We are not different in any other way.
We are Muslim, but modern and Kemalist.’” It was as a young adult that she
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began to study the history of Sabbateanism through books: “We were raised
without learning these customs. They had been totally repudiated in our fami-
ly. I remember noticing that an uncle of mine was fasting, but it wasn’t the
month of Ramadan. When I asked about this, I was told he was making up the
fasts he had missed. Yet the same person did not fast in Ramadan. Years later,
I discovered that this fast had its origins in Judaism, being associated with the
prohibition on eating lamb during a particular season.”
Challenged by the secrecy that surrounded her, Arıg˘ analyzed the minutae of
everyday life in order to find clues to a silent past. In her narrative, she focus-
es on remnants of custom and ritual, cuisine, the use of language (including re-
gional accents, expressions, and jokes), visiting patterns, and social networks.
Arıg˘’s search is reminiscent of psychoanalysis, which looks for traces in the
present of a lost past (Steedman 1995b): “Assimilation is not something to be
proud of. These people were defeated in the struggle for a sense of self. The ex-
istence of something about which one could not speak created a psychological
burden. Vague rumors abounded.”19
Arıg˘ says that no material traces of their Sabbatean heritage remained in the
family home. This was due, in part, to the largely oral nature of cultural trans-
mission in this community.20 It was also because existing documents had been
destroyed during periods of fear of public exposure: “The written culture of
Sabbateanism was destroyed. When I asked my father whether prayers were
available in written form, he told me that my mother had burned them all. Not
only were documents destroyed, but people themselves refused to speak, say-
ing ‘I do not remember.’” Arıg˘, who came of age during the highly politicized
1960s and 1970s, compared her community’s experience to her own as a left-
ist: “During the 1970s, we burned not our traditions but our ideas. I remember
burning books that had been declared ‘highly dangerous’ for reasons I could
never understand.”
According to Arıg˘, the use of language, including regional accents and fam-
ily jokes, provided clues to a hidden past: 
There were family jokes that were incomprehensible to me as a child. For example, I
would sometimes leave my bed to join my parents in their own bed. Whenever I did this,
my grandmother would refer to my own, empty bed as ‘Osman Baba’s bed.’ Much later,
I found out that those families who believed in Osman Baba kept a special room in their
homes where a candle would burn all night by an empty bed, awaiting the messiah. I once
encountered such a bed in a friend’s house. In our home, all that remained was a joke.
Food is a central clue to communal identity.21 Arıg˘, an accomplished cook her-
self, claims that certain dishes can be directly linked to Sabbatean tradition. She
recalls encountering a dish known as mafis¸ at a restaurant in the city of Bursa.
Her conversation with the manager confirmed that the owners of the restaurant
were of Sabbatean origin.22 Arıg˘ also remembers that when she visited her
classmates in their homes, she would sometimes encounter dishes similar to
those found in her own home. She recalls that when she mentioned this, fami-
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ly members would laugh in mysterious fashion. She later understood that this
was because they had realized that the family she visited was also of Sabbatean
origin.
In Arıg˘’s childhood home, both Sabbatean and Muslim rituals were more ev-
ident by their absence than by their presence: “My family did not follow Sab-
batean customs, but it didn’t occur to them to think of themselves as Muslim
either. Few of my mother’s friends fasted or performed the Islamic prayers.”
Among Sabbatean rituals, funerary rites seem to have been the most resilient.
Arıg˘ recalls that Sabbatean funerals were always followed by huge communal
feasts: “As a child, I thought that in all families, death was associated with
food.” According to Arıg˘, it is sometimes the case that both Islamic and Sab-
batean prayers are performed at funerals. While Islamic prayers are public rit-
uals, though, Sabbatean prayers are performed silently and privately. Today,
persons of Kapancı origin are buried in Muslim cemeteries. However, individ-
uals belonging to the more conservative Karakas¸ group still tend to be buried
in a Sabbatean cemetery known as Bülbülderesi in the district of Üsküdar. As
Arıg˘ notes, however, this cemetery is not publicly acknowledged: “You some-
times see funeral ads in the paper which state that the burial will take place in
‘the family plot on the Asian side.’ There is this huge cemetery over there, yet
people still act as if it doesn’t exist.”
According to Arıg˘, her family appealed to Kemalism to account for the ab-
sence of a tradition of Islamic practice: “When I asked why my grandmother
did not perform the Islamic prayers, the answer I received was, ‘We believe in
Atatürk.’ As the concept of secularism made them feel comfortable, they hid
behind the figure of Atatürk, declaring themselves as Kemalists rather than
‘from Salonica.’ Yet there is something missing. I experienced this firsthand.”
This description uncannily resembles middle-class Kemalist households in Re-
publican Turkey, where daily life became largely desacralized.23 In this sense,
the appeal to Kemalism on the part of Arıg˘’s parents might be viewed less as a
disingenious attempt to hide the “truth” from their child than as their present-
ing her with the “truth” as they viewed it at the time. For Arıg˘’s parents, national
identity was expected to subsume communal identity. For Kemalism meant
transcending tradition and cultural difference in the belief in a single, shared na-
tional identity based on (what were taken to be) universal values. In fact, such
a modernist meta-identity was achieved only among an educated urban middle-
class. Ironically, the experience of discrimination under the Republic only
strengthened Sabbateans’ belief in Kemalism’s promise of a national identity
which would supplant all prior tradition. 
Arıg˘ claims that in her relationship with her own daughter, she made a con-
scious attempt to break with the model she was raised with: “I told my daugh-
ter everything I knew about our heritage, emphasizing that she should be proud
of who she was. Even though I have no religious convictions, I am ‘from Sa-
lonica’ insofar as my people come from this culture, this faith.”
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Ultimately, though, what Sabbatean identity means for Arıg˘ in the present is
linked to a particular civilizational stance: 
This identity is not just about how to cook a particular dish, a regional accent or reli-
gious ritual. For me, pride has to do not with faith but with the fact that this communi-
ty was highly sophisticated culturally. They were Europeans: I had a grandmother who
was highly educated. They even had an hour of sports in school back in those days. I am
proud to have come from the European territories of the Ottoman Empire rather than
from Central Anatolia, because I can relate much more easily to a European.
Here, Fatma Arıg˘ comes full circle to her initial discussion of her grandparents.
While identifying Sabbateanism with a modernism highly reminiscent of the
discourse of Kemalism, she accuses the latter of ethnic nationalism. Intrigu-
ingly, her response to betrayal is not to turn to a rediscovered Sabbatean iden-
tity—but to argue for the right to a personal history. 
Fatma Arıg˘ has been criticized for speaking out: “In speaking to you now, I
am breaking the rules. When you try to expose the mask, you are viewed as a
traitor who exposes the secrets of the community. I speak because I am not
ashamed of who I am or where I come from. When I accepted to be interviewed
for a documentary film, my mother would not speak to me. She said that I was
making up tales about things that were long gone. She claimed not to remem-
ber anything. But how can I know, and my mother not?”
conclusion
In this article, I have argued that Sabbatean identity is a useful vantage point
through which to examine the doubly inclusive and exclusive nature of nation-
al identity in Turkey. I have showed that individuals of Sabbatean heritage both
identified with and were betrayed by the Kemalist modernity project. Individ-
uals of Sabbatean heritage identified with Kemalism for historical reasons and
because secularism promised a national identity which would transcend tradi-
tion. Yet the continued identification between Turkishness and Muslim her-
itage/Turkish ethnicity meant that individuals with different personal histories
felt compelled to hide their origins. This resulted in the suppression of memo-
ry within the family, creating a rift between parents and children.
The Turkish experience raises the question as to whether Kemalism has suc-
ceeded in creating its own tradition as the basis for subjectivity, and what the
relationship of this new subject is to the past. Fatma Arıg˘ identifies with what
she considers the “Europeanness” of Sabbateanism as opposed to the “Muslim
Turks of Anatolia.” This both replicates and points to the heart of the contra-
diction within Kemalism itself, which vacillates between a Eurocentric mod-
ernism posing as cultural universalism and the attempt to construct a local iden-
tity based on an imagined ethnic-religious heritage. Kemal Kiris¸çi (2000) has
shown that in the early Republican period, Muslim immigrants from the Bal-
kans were viewed as the ideal citizens of the Turkish Republic. The story of
Sabbateans in Turkey suggests that it may well be that Sabbateans are true Ke-
malists, but not for the reasons suggested by Islamists. 
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The case of Fatma Arıg˘ shows that, while creating its own tradition, the Turk-
ish modernity project has been limited by its refusal to acknowledge the mul-
ticultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire. Speaking in the present, Fatma Arıg˘
is willing to publicly acknowledge her ethnic/religious origins. She has no wish
to be a Sabbatean though: she only desires her personal past—to have access
to memory, which was denied her by the silence within her family and in the
public sphere in Turkey. 
The greatest fear of individuals of Sabbatean background is that they will be
viewed as “outsiders.” This is the fate of a society in which the ambiguity which
characterizes national identity means that it is difficult to know who is “inside.”
The Turkish Republic was established on the assumption that acknowledging
the plural cultural legacy of the Ottoman Empire would threaten the creation of
a singular national identity. Three generations on, despite political polarization,
there is growing pressure from below for the acknowledgement of the past by
subjects searching for their personal histories. Today, accepting the different
personal histories of citizens who share a commitment to a democratic society
can only contribute to societal unity, rather than posing a threat to it (Shapiro
2000). The promise of Turkish national identity was its performative, presen-
tist, incorporative dimension. Its failure was its exclusionary practice.
notes
1. According to an informant of Sabbatean background, terms used within the com-
munity centered on the opposition between insiders (içerlikli) and outsiders (dıs¸arlıklı).
On the other hand, dönme and Selanikli, when used as terms of address, invariably have
a derogatory meaning. Persons of Sabbatean background tend to recall first hearing these
terms as children—often as a jeer or insult by a stranger (Canel 1999, Blumental and
Grosman 1992).
2. Officially Muslim, Sabbateans tend to be absent from the official record. Selim
Deringil (1999:208) notes that they are referred to as avdeti in Ottoman documents of
the nineteenth century. Avdet implies a return, or homecoming, and in this sense is clos-
er in meaning to the term for genuine conversion (mühtedi) than the term dönme, which
puts the emphasis on a previous state or identity. Nevertheless, in the case discussed by
Deringil, a young woman who takes up with a Muslim is referred to as a convert, even
though the dönme were technically Muslim.
3. Kızılbas¸ is a derogatory term for Alevism, a heterodox belief system historically
defined in opposition to Sunni identity in Anatolia (Olsson 1998). Like Sabbateanism,
Alevi identity is based on dissimulation. Regarding incest, it is no coincidence that a
contemporary author refers to the Sabbateans as the “Jewish Shiites” (Yelda 1996): ru-
mors concerning the ritual practice of incest have been historically circulated in relation
to both Sabbateans and the Alevi. According to some accounts, the Spring Equinox co-
incided with a celebration known as the “holiday of the lamb” (kuzu bayramı), when
Sabbateans were rumored to perform a ritual in which couples exchanged partners. Nas-
si claims that this ritual resembles ancient pagan celebrations of rebirth in nature in the
ancient Middle East (Nassi 1992). However, as in the case of the Alevi, it is difficult to
distinguish between insiders’ practices and outsiders’ allegations. There is need for his-
torical and ethnographic research to better understand the relationship between practice
and myth—yet the very reluctance (or inability) to discuss these identities in public con-
tributes to the circulation of myth.
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4. Canel (1999) notes that a taxi driver in Istanbul, upon hearing the term dönme, as-
sumed she was working with persons who had undergone a change in sexual identity.
5. “Sabbatai Sevi I await you” (in Judeo-Spanish) was a common prayer among Sab-
bateans who waited for their messiah near the watercourse (Baer 1999b).
6. As Selim Deringil (1999) demonstrates, modernization had deeply penetrated Ot-
toman society, including the Hamidian regime.
7. Mehmet Cavid Bey, who was also a prominent politician in the Republican peri-
od, was hung in 1926, accused of being implicated in a plot to assassinate Mustafa Ke-
mal Atatürk.
8. Somewhat later, in 1922, another well-known journalist of Sabbatean origins, Ah-
met Emin Yalman, would marry a woman of Muslim heritage in Istanbul with the bless-
ing of her father, despite the protests of acquaintances (Korle 1997). It is intriguing
(though hardly surprising) that neither Sertel nor Yalman refer to their Sabbatean ori-
gins in their memoirs (Sertel 1969; Yalman 1970).
9. At this time, some members of the Sabbatean community made an unsuccessful
plea to the Greek government to remain in Salonica on the grounds of their Jewish ori-
gins (Scholem 1971). 
10. It should also be noted that Hasan Tahsin (Osman Devres), one of the heroes of
the Turkish nationalist movement, known for “aiming the first shot” at occupying Greek
troops in Izmir on 15 May 1919, was of Sabbatean origin (Ortaylı 1998).
11. In a book published in 1939, Ibrahim Gövsa, who worked as an administrator at
a school run by Sabbateans in Makriköy (Bakırköy) in Istanbul, claimed that Sab-
bateanism was alive and well: he reportedly discovered Sabbatean prayers in students’
notebooks, noted that the Sabbatean proscription against eating lamb before the Spring
equinox was followed, and that prayers were offered to Sevi near the watercourse
(Gövsa 1939).
12. Sabbatean identity has also come into public view through the work of Islamists
and extreme nationalists. The goal of these writers is to expose the “Jewish origins” of
individuals, particularly those in the public eye, in order to confirm that “real” Turks
(e.g. Anatolian Muslims) are dominated by “outsiders” who have imposed the Kemal-
ist project on Turkish society (Bali 1999a). Thus, the argument about Atatürk’s supposed
Jewish origins makes it possible to “explain” the betrayal of tradition represented by the
Kemalist project. This increases the pressure on individuals of Sabbatean background
to hide their origins. At the same time, though, a belief in Mustafa Kemal’s Sabbatean
origins tends to circulate among persons of Sabbatean background, or at least their com-
mon origins in the city of Salonica creates a special bond. Though there is little histori-
cal evidence of a genealogical connection, there were undoubtedly close ideological ties
between Muslims and Sabbateans committed to a modernist vision in Salonica.
13. Due to secrecy, mixed marriages, and the fact that Sabbateans are officially Mus-
lim, it is difficult to estimate the number of individuals of Sabbatean heritage in Turkey.
According to Itzhak Ben Zvi (1963), Sabbateans numbered 15,000 in 1943. Saban
(1988–1991) concurs with this view. Gad Nassi (1992) gives an estimate of 40,000–
60,000, while Zorlu claims (1998) there are as many as 100,000.
14. Özgür Canel interviewed several individuals of Sabbatean background who ac-
knowledged their identity but spoke on the condition of anonymity.
15. In this film, produced and circulated in France, only the first names of interview-
ees are provided in order to protect their privacy (Blumental and Grosman 1992).
16. I interviewed Fatma Arıg˘ on 22 September 1997. A newspaper article about her
life (Neyzi 1997) was later included in a book on oral history (Neyzi 1999).
17. The work of Blumental and Grosman (1992), Özgür Canel (1999), and Ilgaz Zor-
lu (1998) suggests that Arıg˘ is not alone in her search for a personal history. Subsequent
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to interviewing Fatma Arıg˘, I interviewed three other informants of Sabbatean back-
ground in Istanbul. These informants, though acknowledging their heritage, preferred
not to have the interview recorded or their names cited. These interviews largely con-
firm the analysis presented here. Needless to say, it is difficult to discuss Sabbatean iden-
tity with persons who deny their heritage altogether, or who may be in favor of main-
taining a separate identity. 
18. The notion of Rumelilik, or being from the European territories of the Ottoman
Empire, remains a central trope within Kemalism. Not only are Mustafa Kemal and oth-
er leading elites themselves from Rumeli, but as Kemal Kiris¸çi (2000) shows, special
preference was given to immigrants from Rumeli in the 1930s, as they were considered
a “civilizing” influence on the “backward” Anatolian mainland. 
19. In a similar vein, Ilgaz Zorlu (1998) claims that a pervasive fear of the outside
world and a belief in the need to protect family members has resulted in an inward-
orientation and in undue pressures on children in the community.
20. However, one type of document historically valued by Sabbateans was genealo-
gies, important means of keeping track of relatedness and marriage. Referring to a pri-
vately compiled computerized database of genealogies among Kapancı families, Arıg˘
notes the transnational networks of Sabbatean families: “Someone who begins to put 
together their family tree might run across a gardener in Italy or an investment firm in
Switzerland. People’s roots and networks extend to places like Italy, Austria, and even
America.”
21. A cookbook published in Athens attests to the central role played by cuisine (and
by women) in the transmission of culture in families of Sabbatean origin (Eden and
Stavroulakis 1997).
22. The recipe for this dish can be found in a Sabbatean cookbook (Eden and
Stavroulakis 1997).
23. On the other hand, continuity in what may be termed a meta-religious spiritual
tradition in Turkey should not be underestimated (Ocak 1999)—perhaps this made it
easier for many to adjust to the loss of the outward trappings of organized religion in the
early Republican period. 
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